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Many modern computing systems have to operate in environments that are highly 
interconnected, highly unpredictable, in a constant state of flux, have no centralized point 
of control, and have constituent components owned by a variety of stakeholders that each 
have their own aims and objectives. Relevant exemplars include the Web, Grid 
Computing, Peer-to-Peer systems, Sensor Networks, Cloud Computing, Pervasive 
Computing and many eCommerce applications. Now, although these areas have 
somewhat different areas of emphasis, we believe they can all be viewed as operating 
under the same conceptual model. Namely, one in which: (i) entities offer a variety of 
services in some form of institutional setting; (ii) other entities connect to these services 
(covering issues such as service discovery, service composition and service 
procurement); and (iii) entities enact services, subject to service agreements, in a flexible 
and context sensitive manner. Moreover, we believe agent-based computing, with its 
emphasis on autonomous, flexible action and interaction, is an appropriate computational 
model for conceptualizing, designing and implementing such systems (Jennings, 2000; 
Jennings 2001). In particular, such agents are a natural way of viewing flexible service 
providers and consumers that need both to respond to environmental change, while being 
able to work towards their individual and collective aims. Moreover, the interactions 
between these agents need to take place in some form of electronic institution that 
structures the interactions and can provide an effective matching of the appropriate 
producers and consumers. Everyday examples of such institutions might include: eBay, 
Second Life, Betfair exchanges or World of Warcraft. Nevertheless, in the work 
described here, we will focus specifically on trading institutions and in particular 
computational service economies that mediate the exchanges between software agents in 
the area of software services. 
In more detail, when thinking about the design of such computational service economies 
there are two major perspectives that need to be considered (Dash et al., 2003). First, 
there is the design of the institution itself; this can essentially be thought of as the rules of 
the game. This covers issues such as who are the valid participants (e.g. buyers, sellers, 
intermediaries), what are the interaction states (e.g. accepting bids, negotiation closed), 
what are the events causing state transitions (e.g. bid, time out, proposal accepted), what 
are the valid actions of the participants (e.g. propose, accept, reject, counter-propose) and 
what are the reward structures (e.g. who pays and who gets paid for what). Second, there 
is the design of the strategies for the agents that participate in the institution; this can 
essentially be thought of as how to succeed in the game. Such strategies are very much 
determined by the institutional rules and are essentially the decision making employed to achieve the agents’ trading objectives. They can range from the very simple, to the very 
complex and they can be targeted at maximising the benefit to the individual agent (self 
interest) or to the wider group (social welfare).  
With the team here at Southampton, we have focused on both the techniques for 
constructing such computational service economies and on developing applications using 
such techniques. In the former case, we have made advances in the areas of auctions 
(Dash et al., 2007, David et al., 2007; Rogers et al., 2007a; Vetsikas et al., 2007; Gerding 
et al., 2008), coalition formation (Dang and Jennings, 2006; Fatima et al., 2009; Rahwan 
and Jennings, 2007; Chalkiadakis et al., 2008; Rahwan et al., 2009), automated 
negotiation (Fatima et al., 2006; Karunatillake et al., 2009; Ramchurn et al., 2007; 
Fatima et al., 2004), trust and reputation (Ramchurn et al., 2009; Reece et al., 2007), 
flexible reasoning strategies for workflows (Stein et al., 2009a) and decentralized 
coordination (Rogers et al., 2007b, Farinelli et al., 2008). In the latter case, we have built 
applications using these techniques in areas such as: virtual organizations (Norman et al., 
2004), emergency response (Chapman et al., 2009), sensor networks (Padhy et al., 2006; 
Kho  et al., 2009; Rogers et al., 2009), mobile sensors (Stranders et al., 2009), 
computational grids (Stein et al., 2009b) and personalized recommendations (Wei et al., 
2005; Payne et al., 2006).  
In the context of this work, it is possible to identify three broad types of application that 
we have been involved with. First, are those in which we, as system designers, have 
control over the institution, but not the strategies of the participating agents. Second, are 
those in which we have control over the agents’ strategies, but not the institution. Finally, 
are those in which we have control over both the strategy and the institution.  We will 
now briefly provide details of exemplar applications that we have recently developed 
from each class.  
First, we consider an application of computational service economies for environmental 
sensor networks in general (Rogers et al., 2005) and glacial monitoring in particular (see 
figure 1). In this work we developed an energy-aware self-organized routing algorithm 
for the networking of simple battery-powered wireless micro-sensors that might be 
owned by different organisations or individuals. In these networks, the battery life of 
individual sensors is typically limited by the power required to transmit their data to a 
receiver or sink. Thus effective network routing algorithms allow us to reduce this power 
and extend both the lifetime and the coverage of the sensor network as a whole. In 
particular, if agents offer the service of forwarding information toward the basestation for 
one another, then the overall system can sense the environment for longer. However, 
implementing such routing algorithms with a centralized controller is undesirable due to 
the physical distribution of the sensors, their limited localization ability and the dynamic 
nature of such networks (given that sensors may fail, move or be added at any time and 
the communication links between sensors are subject to noise and interference). Against 
this background, we devised a distributed mechanism that enabled individual sensors to 
follow locally selfish strategies, which, in turn, result in the self-organization of a routing 
network with desirable global properties. The mechanism uses a locally calculated 
‘payment scheme’ that allows individual sensors to make local decisions as to whether their own limited battery resources would be better used to transmit their own 
information, or used to forward the information of other sensors in the network. We 
showed that our mechanism performs close to the optimal solution (as computed by a 
centralized optimizer), it deals adaptively with changing sensor numbers and topology, 
and it extends the useful life of the network by a factor of three over the traditional 
approach. 
                
Figure 1: Deploying the environmental sensors at the Briksdalsbreen glacier in Norway. 
Left part is the sensors being blasted into the ice, right part is an individual sensor node. 
Second, we consider work on developing strategies for auctions that allocate aircraft 
engines that require maintenance to repair and overhaul bases (Vytelingum et al., 2009). 
In this context, the structure of the electronic institution is fixed. In particular, it is a 
variant of the Continuous Double Auction (CDA) in which there are multiple buyers 
(aircraft that require maintenance or repair services for their engines) and multiple sellers 
(workshops that are able to offer the service of undertaking such work) that need to be 
matched on an ongoing basis (see figure 2). The challenge in this case is to design an 
effective strategy for the participating agents. In particular, we developed a novel strategy 
that is based on both short and long-term learning that allows such agents to adapt their 
bidding behaviour to be efficient in a wide variety of environments (Vytelingum et al., 
2008). For the short-term learning, the agent updates the aggressiveness of its bidding 
behaviour (more aggressive means it will trade off profit to improve its chance of 
transacting, less aggressive that it targets more profitable transactions and is willing to 
trade of its chance of transacting to achieve them) based on market information observed 
after any bid or ask appears in the market. The long-term learning then determines how 
this aggressiveness factor influences an agent’s choice of which bids or asks to submit in 
the market, and is based on market information observed after every transaction 
(successfully matched bid and ask). The principal motivation for the short-term learning is to enable the agent to immediately respond to market fluctuations, while for the long-
term learning it is to adapt to broader trends in the way in which the market demand and 
supply changes over time. We benchmark our strategy against the current state of the art 
and show that it outperforms these benchmarks in both static and dynamic environments.  
 
Figure 2: Aero-Engine Repair and Overhaul Interface. The multiple service lines of four 
overhaul bases (A, H, S and T) are shown on the right of the figure with the current 
engine schedule. The left of the figure shows the current state of the engine pool and 
indicates which aircraft are currently awaiting engine removal. 
Finally, we consider the case where we, as system designers, have control over both the 
agents’ strategies and the institution design. Specifically we consider the case where 
teams of sensors need to coordinate with one another in order to focus the system 
resources on high priority targets or locations (see Figure 3). Now, in most realistic 
settings, this needs to be carried out in a decentralised fashion because of the scale of the 
operation and the inherent dynamism of the domain. In this setting, the design of the 
institution involved determining the type and content of messages that can be exchanged 
between the interacting agents, the solution concept that is required (in this case, the 
agents adopted a cooperative strategy of maximising the total amount of information 
within the system, and were thus attempting to maximise the social welfare of the 
system), and finally, the computational algorithm that is used to compute this solution. 
The particular algorithm developed within this work is a derivative of the max-sum message passing algorithm (Farinelli et al., 2008) and this proved to be very effective. In 
particular, it finds good solutions to this global optimisation problem in a decentralised 
fashion, it is communication efficient, there is no aggregation of calculations at a single 
agent, it operates with asynchronous communications and calculations, it degrades 
gracefully with lossy communication and it continuously adapts solution within dynamic 
setting. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Coordinated tracking with teams of sensors (represented as helicopters). Blue 
shaded region represents the agent’s direction of observation, yellow lines indicate inter-
agent communication, and red dots are targets of interests. 
 In summary, we believe that computational service economies are a good basis for 
designing and building many complex systems. They provide a good set of conceptual 
structures and there is a strong toolset available from the fields of decision theory, game 
theory, mechanism design, information theory and machine learning. Nevertheless, 
determining system behaviour and/or the effectiveness of the individual participants in 
such systems is always going to be a challenging task, because of their decentralised 
nature, the presence of multiple stakeholders, and the limited degree of control over parts 
of the system. But, at this time, the technology is beginning to mature such that real-
world applications are now starting to be practicable. 
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